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RECENT DECISIONS
pared to continue whittling away at immunities which no longer have
any real reason for their existence.
FREDERICK A. MUTH
Constitutional Law: Obscenity Censorship in Wisconsin-The
district attorney of Milwaukee county, acting under. statutory au-
thority,1 commenced action seeking to have Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer declared obscene. The challenged book, an autobiographical novel,
recounts the experiences of an American artist living in Paris during the
depression. A substantial portion of the narrative delineates in detail
through the use of vulgar language, sexual experiences of the author
and his associates. "References to the sexual episodes . . . are made
in short English words of ancient origin and wide, but not often printed
usage."' 2 Tropic of Cancer, nevertheless, has received considerable at-
tention as a serious literary work, and has been held to demonstrate
substantial writing ability.
The circuit court, after a trial without jury, concluded that "the
book is repugnant to decency and the moral standards of the commu-
nity, and has no literary, cultural, social or educational value. ' 3 On
appeal from this judgment the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a four to
three decision reversed the circuit court's finding of obscenity. 4
Justice Fairchild, writing the majority opinion, reiterates the
court's previous determination 5 that the word "obscene" in the Wis-
consin statute is the equivalent of the definition enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court and referred to as the Roth test.' The
test outlined was "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 7 "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance" were to enjoy full constitutional
protection.8
In light of these statements, the Wisconsin court concludes that
there can be no declaration of obscenity without consideration of such
factors as "the seriousness of the author's purpose, the social importance
of the idea expressed, or the artistic quality of expression."" A balancing
of factors is declared essential for a determination of the dominant
1 Wis. STAT. §269.565 (1961).
2 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 121 N.W. 2d 545, 551
(1963).3 Id. at 147, 121 N.W. 2d at 552.
4 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W. 2d 545 (1963).
5 State v. Chabot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 112, 106 N.W. 2d 286, 288 (1960).
6 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, supra note 4, at 138, 121 N.W. 2d at 547.
7Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
8 Id. at 484.
9 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, supra note 4, at 142, 121 N.W. 2d at 549.
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theme and "where a work of apparent serious purpose is involved, the
scales will not be readily tipped toward a determination of obscenity."'10
Justice Fairchild's opinion also considers the role of the appellate
court in obscenity cases. If the ordinary civil rule were followed, a
lower court's finding of fact could be reversed only if contrary to law
or the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The ma-
jority of the court feels that a determination of obscenity is not a
mere finding of fact, but involves a most vital constitutional issue.
Hence, "when constitutional protection is claimed, the judge or appel-
late court must make an independent review of the material," especi-
ally since in obscenity cases the evidence is predominantly documen-
tary." The opinion concludes that the book itself constitutes the most
weighty evidence and the "appellate court should not be bound by the
decision of the trial court based upon its own reading of the pertinent
matter."12
As a result of their independent reading, the majority of the court
concludes that the trial court gave too much weight to the author's use
of vulgar language and the description of incidents violative of ordinary
standards of conduct, and insufficient consideration to the book as an
important literary work. They decide that some of the episodes, taken
alone, appeal to prurient interests, but that "the dominant theme of the
book taken as a whole, does not."' 3
Chief Justice Brown in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Currie, denies the permissibility of reversing the circuit court findings
which he believes to be in accord with the weight of the evidence. The
judgment must, therefore, be affirmed unless upon perusal of the book
itself, it is found as a matter of law that Tropic of Cancer is not con-
stitutionally obscene. The dissent warns that expert testimony received
by the trial court cannot be ignored by the appellate court and declares
that an independent reading of the book would not in any case lead to
a conclusion contrary to that of the trial court. A re-reading even in
light of the added requirement of a "patently offensive portrayal" can-
not but lead to a determination of constitutional obscenity.14
Justice Hallows in a separate dissent rejects a limitation of censor-
ship to hard-core pornography and the balancing of factors to deter-
mine the dominant theme of any material. He supports the view that
"the difference between obscenity, pornography, and hard-core pornog-
raphy, is an extra-legal mythical distinction. All pornography is ob-
scene."' 1 With respect to the balancing process, it is his opinion that
purpose and literary quality, or social value will not in themselves pre-
10 Id. at 143, 121 N.W. 2d at 550.
11 Id. at 148, 121 N.W. 2d at 552.
12 Id. at 148, 121 N.W. 2d at 553.
13 Id. at 151, 121 N.W. 2d at 554.
14 Id. at 154, 121 N.W. 2d at 556.
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vent a determination of obscenity. "It is fallacious to argue what would
be otherwise obscene is not obscene because it has social significance
or some literary merit."16
Justice Hallows believes that the majority in arriving at their de-
cision have ignored the testimony of the expert witnesses, called by the
respondent, concerning the effect of the challenged book on the average
person as judged by the community standard. He also believes that too
much weight was given to the testimony of appellant's witness as to
the dominant theme of the book-a theme which the majority is hard
put to express.'
The present case presents two questions deserving of closer atten-
tion: the correct application of the Roth test in a concrete situation and
the proper role of the appellate court in an obscenity case.
In the Roth-case, the Court discussed obscenity on a highly theoreti-
cal basis, determining the constitutionality of a federal obscenity, statute.
The Court held that no issue was raised as to the obscenity of the par-
ticular material involved: "Both the Alberts and Roth cases reached the
United States Supreme Court at a very- high level of abstraction-a
level so high that the facts of the two cases had become literally ir-
relevant."' 8 -Only Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion attempted to
apply the majority's obscenity test to, the pertinent material. 9 -The. ma-
jor.ity opinion,- however, left a residue of doubt concerning .the concrete
application of the generalized verbalization, which is the RQth. tet. The
question remains; just what type of material is constitutionally obscene.
. The majority -opinion, did indicate that the term '"pbscenity" was to
be construed narrowly. All ideas of even the slightest social value were
to -enjoy constitutional protection; obscenity was that which had no
social importance. The_ metaphorical door of. governmental intrusion
into obscenity'censorship was to be "kept tightly closed and opened only
the slightest crack necessary. ' ' 0 % , .. ...
. In light of the Roth derisioxi, Justice Fairchild apparently draws
the dual conclusion that a balancing process is necessary for a determina-
tion of obscenity and that only hard-core pornography is .constitution-
ally obscene. Certainly the first part of this conclusion is reasonable.
The very use of the term "dominant theme" involves the connotation
of a balancing relationship. Appeal to prurient interest must be meas-
ured against other factors. Only if it dominates and over-balances literary
and social value will the material be declared obscene.
This is not to say that an obscene work will be spared because of
35 Id. at 156, 121 N.W. 2d at 557.
16 Id. at 156, 121 N.W. 2d at 556.
17 Id. at 159, 121 N.W. 2d at 558.
ISLockhart and 'McClure, Censorship or Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 25 (1960).
'9 Roth v. United States, supra note 7, at 502.20 Id. at 488.
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some subservient literary skill or lofty purpose exhibited by the author.
If such were the position of the majority, Justice Hallows' criticism
would indeed be a telling one. Literary skill obviously would serve to
make a dominant pornographic theme more effective.2
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions lend some credence
to the belief that only hard-core pornography will be found obscene.
Four per curiam decisions have apparently indicated the strict limita-
tion to be placed on the scope of obscenity censorship; each case in-
volved a reversal of a previous obscenity finding. 2 A more recent de-
cision has added the requirement of a "patently offensive portrayal"
for a judgment of obscenity. 23 The belief in a limitation of constitutional
obscenity to unadulterated pornography devoid of any literary pretense
was also reiterated in a recent Massachusetts decision. 24 The problem
is that the hard-core standard is an absolute one and involves no need
for balance and comparison. If hard-core pornography has no literary
value, then any matter with even the slightest literary credentials would
enjoy constitutional protection. A balancing process would be mean-
ingless since the presence of any social or literary appeal would be
found to dominate over the appeal to prurient interest. A finding of
obscenity would be made only when the sole theme, not the dominant
theme, of the material appeals to prurient interest.
The question of the appellate court's proper role in obscenity cases
presents a most crucial problem. The majority opinion espouses a policy
of independent review; the dissents hold the appellate court bound by
the factual findings of the lower court unless against the preponderance
of the evidence.
The danger of an independent review, based solely upon the appel-
late court's opinion of the questionable material has been clearly indi-
cated." The appellate court could establish itself as an arbiter of public
taste and morals-a position it is not qualified to fill. Such a policy
could also lead to a great deal of instability in the censorship field. On
the other hand, the obscenity cases present not ordinary factual ques-
tions but issues with strong constitutional overtones. The rights in-
volved in this area are so precious that the court cannot abdicate its
power to consider the constitutional issues.
Justice Harlan's opinion in the Roth case emphasized the peculiar
responsibility of the appellate court "to determine for itself whether the
attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards."
21 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, supra note 4, at 156, 121 N.W. 2d at 556.
22Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1955) ; Mounce v. United
States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) ; and
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
23 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
24 Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E. 2d 328
(1962).
5 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
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Every "suppression raises an individual constitutional problem" and the
appellate court cannot "escape this responsibility by saying that the trier
of fact has labelled the questionable matter obscene." 26 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court recently expressed the same view while holding
that the appellate court is in "essentially the same position as the trial
judge" and may draw its own inferences from the facts since the only
important evidence is documentary.27
A related problem not actually considered by the Wisconsin court
is the role of expert testimony in an obscenity case. Justice Frankfurter
in Smith v. California warned of the absolute necessity of expert testi-
mony for a proper determination. 2 In the present case experts were
consulted in an effort to determine the dominant theme of the book, the
community standard, and the effect of the book. The majority of the
court considered the book itself as the most important evidence but did
refer to the testimony of appellant's witnesses concerning the literary
quality of the book. Justice Hallows' dissent emphasized the testimony
of respondent's witnesses as to the effect of the book judged by the
community standards. The decision nevertheless, leaves unclear the real
function of expert testimony and the importance that the appellate court
should place upon it. For the court to totally ignore expert testimony
could lead to imposition of the court's own personal taste and moral
code upon the community.
Some mention should be made of the treatment accorded Tropic of
Cancer in other jurisdictions. The book drew judicial attention in 1953
when a federal court upheld the bureau of custom's refusal to admit it
into the country. The court ruled that "obscenity, though a part of a
composition of high literary merit, will not be spared whether written
in the style of the realists, surrealists or plain shock writers. '29 The
court, however, was not applying a Roth type test but rather the tra-
ditional and now rejected Hicklin test based on the effect of isolated
passages on the most susceptible reader.30
In 1962, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, construing an obscenity
statute similar to Wisconsin's held the book not to be obscene and the
statute to apply solely to hard-core pornography. The majority of the
court held that:
It is not relevant. . . that the book at many places is repulsive, vul-
gar and grossly offensive in the use of four letter words, and in the
detailed and coarse statement of sexual episodes. That a serious
work uses four letter words and has a grossly offensive tone
26 Roth v. United States, supra note 7, at 498.
2 7 Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," supra note 24, at 329.
28 Note 25 supra.
29 Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).3 0 Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 Q.B. 360..
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does not mean that the work is not entitled to constitutional pro-
tection.3 '
Recently the highest courts of New York and California have also
ruled on Tropic of Cancer. The New York court held that any book
which does not pass the Roth test is hard-core pornography even though
highly considered by the literary community. The book was declared
obscene since the majority of the court felt that the favorable literary
criticism accorded to it did not "expunge from its pages the flagrantly
obscene and patently offensive matter that dominates the book as a
whole."
3 2
The California court, limiting obscenity to hard-core pornography,
did not consider the book obscene. The court also declared that a limita-
tion of obscenity to hard-core pornography "does not permit a balancing
of the work's social importance against its prurient appeal. Rather, the
presence of matters of social importance entitles a book to the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. '33
In general, these cases indicate the growing limitation of obscenity
censorship. The Roth test is no more than a reaction against the re-
strictive Hicklin test-a set of negative precepts in a positive formula.
A work is no longer to be judged by isolated passages, by their effect
upon the susceptible, or by antiquated standards. The court thus gave
notice of how not to censor but did not indicate what material could
be censored. There is no difficulty in the case of the serious literary
work or of a purely pornographic work, but a very real problem arises
in the case of borderline material.
The "dominant theme" test places a heavy burden of literary
criticism upon the courts and at the same time threatens the artist's
freedom of expression. The situation is alleviated by the use of expert
testimony to guide the court, yet the danger remains that such testimony
may be ignored and the judgment grounded on personal tastes and
moral viewpoint.
Alternatively, censorship may be limited to the totally inartistic. The
threat to artistic freedom is decreased, but in all probability the pro-
tection afforded society is not appreciably lessened. The most offensive
work remains subject to censorship and the material available to minors
subject to control. At the same time, the dearth of judicial publicity
and the very nature of the material will minimize the interest of the
average reader. A danger still exists in the case of the emotionally
immature, but even the Roth test does not offer complete security in
this respect.
Perhaps a compromise position might even be found by allowing
31 Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer,"supra note 24, at 334.32 People v. Fritch, 32 U.S.L. W~rz 1013 (U.S. July 23, 1963).33 Zeitlin v. Arnebergb, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 1013 (U.S. July 23, 1963).
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censorship of a work not totally devoid of style, but whose artistry is
completely subservient to an obvious pornographic aim. Whatever posi-
tion is adopted in any jurisdiction, it may be hoped that it at least be a
consistent one. Clearly the hard-core and balancing theories are in-
compatible. Unfortunately, the Wisconsin court speaks in terms of a
balancing process, while the decision in effect limits censorship to hard-
core pornography. MICHAEL S. NOLAN
Res Ipsa Loquitur: Application of the Doctrine Where a Plain-
tiff Is Contributorily Negligent-The plaintiff, Mrs. Wilma Turk,
and her five year old son were riding an escalator in defendant, H. C.
Prange's department store. In prior trips to defendant's store they had
often used this escalator. Mrs. Turk's son's galosh became caught in
the tread of the escalator. The boy began screaming and the plaintiff
took hold of his waist trying to free him without success. The escalator
continued moving, and the plaintiff lost her balance and fell, fracturing
her wrist on the steel stair of the escalator. The trial court held that
res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and in a special verdict, only the plaintiff
was found to have acted negligently.
The supreme court, in Turk v. H. C. Prange Co.,1 reversed the
lower court's holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applic-
able and that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was
not an absolute bar to its invocation. The court pointed out that, if the
defendant were found negligent, the plaintiff's injury would be a
"natural consequence" of the defendant's negligence.2 It reasoned that
in light of Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute :3
... this third element of freedom from contributory negligence
is not a requirement for the application of res ipsa loquitur and
that if the defendant is found negligent, plaintiff's contributory
negligence, if any, goes to the question of comparison of negli-
gence as between the plaintiff and the defendant.4
The significance of this decision can be best understood in light of
the function of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence in
Wisconsin. The doctrine creates a permissible inference of negligence
on the part of the person against whom it is invoked. It allows a jury
to find causal negligence solely upon circumstantial evidence. The jury
may accept or reject the inference, which is sufficient to support a
verdict.5 The defendant, to prevent the inference from arising, must
meet or overcome it by explaining the occurrence, or by showing that
118 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W. 2d 365 (1963).
2 Id. at 550, 119 N.W. 2d at 371.
3 WIs .STAT. §331.045 (1961).4 Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., supra note 1, at 551, 119 N.W. 2d at 372.
5 Drechsler, Tie Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Wis. BAR BULL. 13 (April,
1957).
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